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COMMENTS
THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE: UNITED STATES
JURISDICTION OVER ACTS OF TORTURE COMMITTED
ABROAD
Historically, a nation's mistreatment of its citizens within its
borders has not been recognized as a violation of international
law.1 After World War II, an international interest in the protec-
tion of human rights began to develop.2 International conventions
produced declarations requiring that nations respect the human
rights of their citizens.3 Enforcement of these declarations was left
to each nation, however, because individual nations retained pri-
mary responsibility for remedying violations of human rights.4 In
Filartiga v. Pefta-Irala,5 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit held that a United States district court had
subject matter jurisdiction in a wrongful death action between two
Paraguayan nationals for an act of torture committed in Para-
guay 6 The court in Filartiga sustained jurisdiction under 28
1. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 441-42 (1964); Dreyfus v.
Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 31 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976); 1 C. HYDE, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW § 55 (2d rev. ed. 1945).
2. See, e.g., Lane, Demanding Human Rights: A Change in the World Legal Order, 6
HOFSTRA L. REV. 269, 279-82 (1978).
3. See, e.g., [European] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms, signed Nov. 4, 1950, entered into force Sept. 3, 1953, Council of Europe,
European Convention on Human Rights: Collected Texts, § 1, Doc. No. 1 (7th ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as European Convention], reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS ON INTERNA-
TIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 125 (L. Sohn & T. Buergenthal ed. 1973) [hereinafter
cited as BASIC DOCUMENTS]; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N.
Doc. A/810, at 71-77 (1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res.
2200, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52-58, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
4. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 3. "[E]ach State
Party to the present Covenant undertakes to adopt such legislative or other measures
as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized m the present Covenant." Id. art.
2, § 2.
5. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
6. Id. at 887.
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U.S.C. § 1350,1 even though section 1350 had been used only twice
before to sustain jurisdiction.8
This Comment will consider whether torture is a violation of in-
ternational law, whether the proper defendant is the torturer or his
government, and whether section 1350 properly construed provides
a district court with subject matter jurisdiction in actions between
aliens for torts committed outside the United States. This Com-
ment concludes that, although torture is a violation of interna-
tional law, torturers are not liable individually and section 1350,
properly construed, does not provide subject matter jurisdiction.
FILARTIGA V PERA-IRALA
The wrongful death action in Filartiga v. Peia-Irala resulted
from the alleged torture of a Paraguayan citizen in Paraguay by
another Paraguayan citizen. At the time of the torture, the defen-
dant, Pefia-Irala, was the Inspector General of Police in Asuncion,
Paraguay The plaintiffs, Dr. Joel Filartiga, the victim's father and
a self-described critic of the Paraguayan government, and Dolly Fi-
lartiga, the victim's sister, alleged that the defendant kidnapped
Dr. Filartiga's son on March 29, 1976, and tortured him to death in
retaliation for Dr. Filartiga's criticism of the Paraguayan regime.9
Dolly Filartiga, the victim's sister, and Pefia, the defendant, had
come to the United States in 1978. In 1979, Dolly Filartiga discov-
ered that Pefia was in the United States. Acting on information
supplied by Dolly, the Immigration and Naturalization Service dis-
covered that Pefia had remained in the United States beyond the
term of his visa and arrested him. Dolly and Dr. Filartiga immedi-
ately brought a civil action in a United States district court against
Pefia demanding compensatory and punitive damages for the
wrongful death of Dr. Filartiga's son. 10 The plaintiffs based their
argument for federal jurisdiction principally on 28 U.S.C. § 1350,
which states that "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdic-
7. Id. at 887 & n.22. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1976) codifies the Alien Tort Statute of the Judici-
ary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789).
8. See Adra v. Clift, 195 F Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961); Bolchos v. Darrell, 3 F Cas. 810
(D.S.C. 1795).
9. 630 F.2d at 878-79.
10. Id.
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tion of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed m
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."11
The plaintiffs, relying on international documents of the United
Nations and other organizations, argued that torture was a viola-
tion of the customary international law of human rights;12 there-
fore, they argued, the district court had jurisdictibn of the case
under section 1350.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion."3 The district court relied on dicta in Dreyfus v. Von Finck'4
and IIT v. Vencap, Ltd. 5 for the proposition "the laws of nations"
as used in section 1350 did not apply to a state's treatment of its
own citizens.' 6 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit reversed and remanded the case, holding that section 1350
provided jurisdiction because "deliberate torture perpetrated
under color of official authority violates the international law
of human rights."'7
TORTURE OF CITIZENS AS A VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
International law is established by the custom and usage of na-
tions."'8 For instance, in The Paquete Habana,"9 the crew of a Cu-
ban coastal fishing vessel interposed a claim for the return of their
cargo which the United States Navy had seized and which was the
subject of a condemnation proceeding as a prize of war.20 The
United States Supreme Court held that by international custom
the cargoes of coastal fishing vessels were exempt from capture as
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1976).
12. 630 F.2d at 879. The plaintiffs in Filartiga relied on "the U.N. Charter; the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights; the U.N. Declaration Against Torture; the American Decla-
ration of the Rights and Duties of Man; and other pertinent declarations " Id.
13. Id. at 880.
14. 534 F.2d 24 (2d Cir.), cert. dented, 429 U.S. 835 (1976).
15. 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
16. 630 F.2d at 880.
17. Id. at 878.
18. In United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 153 (1820), the Supreme Court stated
that "the law of nations may be ascertained by consulting the general usage and
practice of nations " Id. at 160-61.
19. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
20. Id. at 678-79.
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prizes of war.21 The Court relied on opinions of statesmen and
scholars, and provisions of treaties, that affirmed and reaffirmed
the coastal fishing vessel exemption.2
Custom alone, however, does not establish binding international
law: the custom must affect the relations among nations and be
used for the nations' mutual good.23 Policy that becomes custom-
ary in many states merely because each government independently
views the policy as a moral good does not become international
law.21 Simply because nations universally outlaw stealing, for ex-
ample, does not make theft a violation of the law of nations. 5 As a
practical justification for the rule that a custom must affect the
relationship among nations to be part of the law of nations, a na-
tion's interference in the purely internal affairs of another nation
can provoke war.2" Limiting international confrontations to actions
directly affecting the complaining state may minimize the intensity
of the reaction by the state to which the complaint is addressed.
The number of opportunities for confrontation also will be limited.
Because international law deals with the relationships among
states, a nation's mistreatment of its own citizens historically has
21. Id. at 708.
22. Id. at 687-713. "[Wlhat originally may have rested in custom or comity, courtesy or
concession, [has grown], by the general assent of civilized nations, into a settled rule of
international law." Id. at 694.
23. See, e.g., Lopes v. Reederei Richard Schroder, 225 F Supp. 292, 297 (E.D. Pa. 1963); 1
C. HYDE, supra note 1, § 1.
24. See 1 C. HYDE, supra note 1, § 3; 1 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 75
(1963).
25. Interpreting the breadth of the class of cases that could be brought under 28 U.S.c. §
1350, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit determined that § 1350 did
not permit the "view that the Eighth Commandment 'Thou shalt not steal' [was] part of the
law of nations [w]hile every civilized nation doubtless [had] this as a part of its legal
system." IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975).
26. See Lane, supra note 2, at 271-78. Lane argues that the Peace of Westphalia marked
a change in the world legal order. Prior to the Reformation, Europe "was hierarchical in
both its spiritual and secular spheres." Id. at 272. One ruler might be subordinate to another
in the feudal structure. This "hierarchical structure could not accommodate" the modem
political order and as a result it was extremely difficult to settle peacefully conflicts that
"should have been easily resolvable." Id. at 273. To maintain peace among nations it was
necessary to recognize "a new system characterized by the coexistence of a multiplicity of
states, each sovereign within its territory, equal to one another, and free from any external
earthly authority." Id. at 274 (quoting Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948, 42 AM.
J. INT'L L. 20, 28-29 (1948)).
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not been recognized as a violation of international law.27 Nations
have been reluctant to find a violation of international law even if
a nation treats its own citizens in a manner deemed cruel by most
nations. 28 Accordingly, Dreyfus v. Von Finck29 reflects the general
rule that a nation does not violate international law in dealing with
its own citizens.30 In Dreyfus, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit held that no jurisdiction existed under sec-
tion 1350 because confiscation of a German national's property by
Germans acting for the German government was not a violation of
international law.31 The court in Dreyfus determined that, because
international law dealt only with the relationships between states,
violations of international law did not occur when a nation dealt
with its own citizens within its borders.3 2
In Filartiga v. Pefta-Irala,ss the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit argued that torture represented an exception to the general
rule that a nation's dealings with its own citizens are purely do-
mestic matters.3 ' The court in Filartiga determined that world
opinion unanimously maintained that nations could not torture an-
yone, alien or national.3 5 The court emphasized that worldwide
condemnation of torture was expressed in the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights and other international declarations and
conventions, and that torture had been renounced by many nations
individually.6 The court in Filartiga also noted the amicus curiae
brief of the United States, which said that in the experience of the
United States State Department no government has claimed a
right to torture its citizens.37
International agreements may create new rules of international
27. See, e.g., Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 31 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835
(1976).
28. See 1 C. HYDE, supra note 1, § 55.
29. 534 F.2d 24 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976).
30. Id. at 31.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
34. Id. at 884. /
35. Id. at 881-84. "[T]here are few, if any, issues m international law today on which
opinion seems to be so united as the limitations on a state's power to torture persons held in
its custody." Id. at 881.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 884.
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law.38 Moreover, if nations expressly agree to be bound by new
rules, the new rules can become binding even upon non-signatory
nations.3 9 In addition, non-signatory nations will be influenced by
the opinions and practices of the signatories.40 When an interna-
tional organization makes a declaration, the statement is raised
above the level of a national policy statement; the statement re-
ceives the support of a separate entity "possessing objective inter-
national personality ,41 Thus, repeated affirmation of principles in
agreements and declarations of international scope may indicate
that a principle is part of binding international law.42
Commentators agree that World War II atrocities generated con-
cern that human rights be made the subject of international pro-
tection.43 Attitudes changed toward the autonomy of the sovereign
because the sovereign alone could not be relied on to protect
human rights.44 As the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
recognized, "it is essential that human rights should be pro-
tected by the rule of law."' 45 Accordingly, the atrocities committed
by the German government against German citizens during World
War II were declared by the International Military Tribunal at
Nuiremberg to be crimes against humanity 48 International jurisdic-
tion thus was extended beyond violations of the laws of war, which
applied only between nations. The International Military Tribunal,
however, limited jurisdiction to actions connected with aggresive
war.47 Persecutions carried out before the commencement of the
war, including "murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation
and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian popula-
38. See, e.g., 1 C. HYDE, supra note 1, § 3.
39. See, e.g., td., Comment, The Human Rights Phenomenon: An Example of Interna-
tional Law as Authoritative Consensus, 42 ALB. L. REv. 663, 680-81 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as The Human Rights Phenomenon].
40. See, e.g., 1 C. HYDE, supra note 1, § 3; The Human Rights Phenomenon, supra note
39, at 681.
41. 1 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 24, at 74 (quoting Advisory Opinion on Reparation for
Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, [1949] I.C.J. Reports 174, 185).
42. See 1 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 24, at 74.
43. See, e.g., Klayman, The Definition of Torture in International Law, 51 TEMPLE L.Q.
449, 458 (1978); Lane, supra note 2, at 279.
44. See Lane, supra note 2, at 279.
45. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 3, at 71.
46. 11 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 24, at 886.
47. Id.
[Vol. 23:103
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tion,"48 were not declared crimes against humanity or violations of
international law. 9 The United Nations subsequently affirmed in a
1946 resolution and a 1948 convention that genocide was a crime in
violation of international law." Thus, the United Nations recog-
nized that genocide was not only a moral wrong; genocide caused
tangible losses, such as loss of cultural contributions, that directly
affected foreign nations.51 In addition, the Convention on the Pre-
vention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide declared that
genocide violated international law both in times of peace and
war.
52
Against this background of international concern with World
War II atrocities, international agreements manifested a growing
concern with other peacetime violations of human rights. The Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights was approved by Resolution
of the United Nations General Assembly in 1948.53 Although the
Declaration was more a statement of goals than a statement of
binding international law,54 the Universal Declaration was signifi-
cant in several respects. The Declaration suggested that mterna-
tional protection of human rights should not be restricted to spe-
cial categories such as violations associated with war or persecution
of ethnic groups. 5 In addition, the Universal Declaration suggested
that nations had a practical interest in the treatment of citizens in
other nations: each nation's protection of its citizens' human rights
fostered friendly relations between nations.58 Violations of human
rights threatened world peace because such violations forced peo-
48. Id. at 882 (quoting Agreements for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War
Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, E.A.S. no. 472, 82 U.N.T.S.
279).
49. Id.
50. G.A. Res. 96 (1946), reprinted in 11 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 24, at 848; Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, G.A. Res. 260A (1948), re-
printed in BAsIc DocuMENTs, supra note 3, at 69.
51. G.A. Res. 96, supra note 50.
52. G.A. Res. 260A, supra note 50.
53. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 3.
54. The broad-ranging rights of the Umversal Declaration, coupled with the Declaration's
self-description as "a common standard of aclevement for all peoples" indicates that the
Declaration is a statement of goals. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note
3, Preamble.
55. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 3, art. 2.
56. Id. Preamble.
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ple to resort to rebellion to secure their rights.57 In addition to the
right to be free from torture, many other rights were enumerated
in the Declaration, including the right to freedom from slavery, the
right to freedom of expression, the right to work, and the right to
leisure time.58
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,59
adopted by a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly
in 1966, reaffirmed values expressed m the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights of 1948. The Covenant stated that the nations
promised to provide remedies for violations of the rights set forth
in the Covenant."0 This remedial language is significantly stronger
than the language of the Declaration.6 1 Further, the Covenant es-
tablished machinery for international investigation and mediation
of international disputes arising from a nation's alleged mistreat-
ment of its citizens.62 Although nations may, if necessary, avoid ob-
ligations required by the Covenant during national emergencies,
even during emergencies the Covenant provides that nations may
not: torture any person; delay the abolition of capital punishment;
establish slavery or trade in slaves; Imprison a person for failure to
fulfill a contract; deny recognition of anyone as a person before the
law; deny anyone freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; or
impose ex post facto sentences or penalities6 s
57. Id.
58. Id. arts. 4, 19, 23 & 24.
59. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 3.
60. Id. art. 2, § 3. "Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes [t]o ensure that
any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective
remedy " Id.
61. The Universal Declaration states that "every organ of society shall strive by
teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms "Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 3, Preamble.
62. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 3, arts. 28-45. For
example, in certain instances, the Human Rights Committee charged with mediating a dis-
pute may require nations involved in the dispute to supply the Committee with relevant
information. Id. § 1(f). In 1976 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
went into force and the first members of the Human Rights Committee were elected. Status
of International Covenants on Human Rights, Note by the Secretary-General, 33 U.N. ES-
COR, Annex (Agenda Item 18), U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/1227 (1977), reprinted in 1 JoYcE,
HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL DocumENTs 343 (1978).
63. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 3, art. 4, § 2. The
emergency that permits nations to avoid Covenant obligations is an emergency "which
threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed." Id. art. 4,
[Vol. 23:103
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The Proclamation of Tehran,64 endorsed by the General Assem-
bly in 1968, reaffimed that protection of human rights was an in-
ternational concern. The Proclamation stated explicitly that the
nations of the world believed that all nations were obligated to re-
spect and protect human rights.6" Although the Proclamation did
not establish any new international rights,6 the Proclamation was
significant because it indicated the renewed support of the interna-
tional community for the International Covenant.67
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms was signed by the Council of Europe
in 1950, and entered into force in 1953.s The Convention repre-
sented an ambitious regional effort to foster protection of human
rights. Like the International Covenant, the Convention required
that nations protect the rights enumerated in the agreement.69 In
tunes of crisis, a nation may be exempted from its obligations
under the conventions but nations can never deny persons of life,
torture persons, enslave persons, or hold persons guilty for an act
that was not a crime at the time of commission of the act.70 Signifi-
cantly, the European Convention established international mecha-
nisms for dealing with complaints of violations of the Conven-
tion,7 1 including the European Commission of Human Rights,
which is empowered to conduct investigations and negotiate settle-
§ 1. Nonetheless, measures taken during such emergencies may not conflict with obligations
under international law unless necessary for the "exigencies of the situation." Id. A nation
may never resort to the use of torture. Id. art. 4, § 2.
64. G.A. Res. 2442, 23 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 18) 49, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968), reprinted
in BAsic DocumENTs, supra note 3, at 65.
65. "The Universal Declaration of Human Rights constitutes an obligation for the
members of the international community." Id. § 2.
66. The broad range of rights enumerated in the Proclamation of Tehran demonstrated
that the Proclamation was a statement of goals to be sought rather than a list of existing
obligations in the international community. See, e.g., id. § 17.
67. "The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights created new standards
and obligations to which states should conform Id. § 3.
68. European Convention, supra note 3.
69. Id. art. 1.
70. Id. art. 15, para. 2. In a national emergency, the European Convention exempts a
nation from its obligations under the Convention in much the same way as the International
Covenant. Compare European Convention, supra note 3, art. 15 with International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 3, art. 4.
71. European Convention, supra note 3, arts. 19-56.
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ments of disputes.72 In addition, the European Court of Human
Rights is empowered to render final decisions by which the party-
nations promise to abide 3 and can award just satisfaction if the
internal law of a country affords only partial reparation to an in-
jured party 7 4
Judicial opinions of signatory nations of the European Conven-
tion indicate that the signatory nations consider themselves bound
by the Convention.7 5 Thus, the signatory nations made more than
token promises to enforce the rights of the Convention through do-
mestic law. Accordingly, a German administrative court stated that
"deportation of an alien to a country behind the Iron Curtain,
which he left for political reasons, constitutes inhuman treatment
and violates Article 3 of the Convention. 7 6 In addition, a Ger-
man court of appeals stated explicitly that the Convention was
self-executing and had the status of German federal law. 77 Opin-
ions of other courts, if not explicitly recognizing the European
Convention as having substantive force in domestic law, attempt to
reconcile domestic law with the European Convention.7
The American Convention on Human Rights 79 was signed by
several members of the Organization of American States in 1969,
and came into force in 1978.80 The American Convention parallels
the European Convention by calling for national protection of
human rights and providing for international mechanisms to rein-
force domestic protection. 1 In addition, the American Convention
72. Id. art. 28. The European Commission can receive complaints from contracting states
or from victims of violations by contracting states. Id. arts. 24-25.
73. Id. arts. 52-53.
74. Id. art. 50.
75. See, e.g., Judgment of May 16, 1962, OLGE, Bremen, [1962] Neue Juristische
Wochenschrift 1735, reprinted in EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, COLLECTION OF
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL COURTS REFERRING TO THE CONVENTION art. 1, at 1 (1969) [here-
inafter cited as COLLECTION OF DECISIONS].
76. Judgment of Sept. 13, 1955, OVGE, MUnster, [1956] Die 6ffentliche Verwaltung 381
reprinted in COLLECTION OF DECISIONS, supra note 75, art. 3, at 3.
77. See note 75 supra.
78. Judgment of March 16, 1964, C de C, Belgium, [1964] Pasierisie beige 1 762, reprinted
in COLLECTION OF DECISIONS, supra note 75, art. 5, at 22.
79. American Convention on Human Rights, signed Nov. 22, 1969, entered into force July
18, 1978, OAS T.S. No. 36, OAS O.R. OEA/Ser. A/16 [English].
80. ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
HANDBOOK OF EXISTING RULES PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS, app. 8 (1979).
81. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 79, arts. 1 & 2.
[Vol. 23:103112
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against human rights violations. Similarly, a nation may be ex-
pected to complain about acts of torture m order to satisfy its citi-
zens that the nation views torture as immoral. If torture is re-
nounced only because it is universally regarded as immoral, as is
the case with stealing or murder, nations are not bound by interna-
tional law to forego torture of their citizens.96
Despite the possible lack of binding sanctions in international
agreements and the possibility that nations sign international
agreements for purposes that indicate the nations do not intend to
be bound domestically by the agreement, the weight of evidence
indicates that torture is prohibited by international law. In inter-
national agreements, states have agreed that they are obliged to
respect certain human rights. The European Convention is espe-
cially significant because the signatories behave as though they are
obligated to the other nations to respect human rights. The
promises of nations not to violate human rights, even if those
promises are not binding treaties or backed by sanctions, will en-
courage and reinforce the expectation of the world community that
nations will not violate human rights. 7 Thus, the court's decision
in Filartiga that torture violates international law is well-founded.
INDIVIDUAL OR GOVERNMENTAL LmAmLrrY
Because international law deals with the relationships between
nations, violations of international law generally require some find-
ing of action or assumption of responsibility on the part of a na-
96. See note 25 & accompanying text supra.
97. [W]hat causes a treaty to attain such a distinction [as a source of international
law] is not necessarily the number or importance of the contracting parties,
but rather the circumstance that it gives expression to a fresh rule of conduct
which some States, however few, are prepared to respect as such, and which
makes it appeal to, and is eventually accepted by the community of nations.
1 C. HYDE, supra note 1, § 3 (footnote omitted). In the Nuclear Tests Case, the Interna-
tional Court of Justice stated that France's announcements that it would discontinue atmo-
spheric nuclear testing were legally binding on France even though the announcement was
unilateral:
[France] was bound to assume that other States nnght take note of these state-
ments and rely on their being effective. The validity of these statements and
their legal consequences must be considered within the general framework of
the security of international intercourse, and the confidence and trust which
are so essential in the relations among the States.
Nuclear Test Case, [1974] I.C.J. 269.
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tion's government."e The International Covenant, the European
Convention, and the American Convention each require that do-
mestic remedies be exhausted before international enforcement
machinery may undertake an investigation, mediation, or adjudica-
tion of a dispute.9 Accordingly, until a victim of torture has ex-
hausted all remedies and has been denied justice by his national
government, no violation of international law has occurred and no
basis for an international dispute exists.100 Therefore, a transgres-
sion of international law does not occur automatically because the
torturer acts in some capacity as the agency of the government. If
remedies have not been exhausted, a violation of national law by
the individual torturer exists.10 1 For example, if a police officer in
the United States tortures a suspect during interrogation, the po-
lice officer is criminally liable under United States law. Interna-
tional liability on the part of the United States does not arise un-
less the United States fails to provide remedies for the torture.
Exceptions to the requirement of complete exhaustion of domestic
remedies exist, but these exceptions are justified only if some other
form of government acquiescence or ratification of the torture may
be implied.102 One of these exceptions, the existence of an admmis-
trative practice of torture, is noted in The Greek Case,103 heard
before the European Commission of Human Rights in 1969. An ad-
ministrative practice of human rights violations exists when viola-
tions repeatedly occur and are tolerated by the government.1104 In
98. In Dreyfus v. Von Finck, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated "[tihere
is a general consensus that [international law] deals primarily with the relationship
among nations rather than among individuals." 534 F.2d at 30-31.
99. European Convention, supra note 3, art. 26; American Convention on Human
Rights, supra note 79, art. 46; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra
note 3, art. 41.
100. "The [European] Commission may only deal with the matter after all domestic rem-
edies have been exhausted, according to the generally recognized rules of international law."
European Convention, supra note 3, art. 26. See also 2 C. HYDE, supra note 1, § 288.
101. See 2 C. HYDE, supra note 1, §§ 286-88. "The wrongful acts of private individuals
[do] not ordinarily breed international responsibility." Id. at § 289.
102. See zd. §§ 286-88.
103. [1969] Y.B. EuR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 194-96 (Eur. Comm. on Human Rights).
104. [T]wo elements are necessary to the existence of an administrative practice of
torture .. repetition of acts, and official tolerance. By official tolerance is
meant that, though acts of torture are plainly illegal, they are tolerated m
the sense that superiors of those immediately responsible though cognizant of
such acts, take no action to punish them or prevent their repetition; or that
[Vol. 23:103
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provides that even in times of emergency a nation may not infringe
on: the right to recognition as a person before the law; the right to
life; the right to humane treatment, including freedom from tor-
ture; freedom from slavery; freedom from ex post facto laws; free-
dom of conscience and religion; the right to have a family; the right
to a given name; the right to protection of the child; the right to a
nationality; and the right to take part in government through elec-
tions . 2 The American Convention provided that the machinery for
international enforcement should be established only after the
Convention went into effect.83 Thus, because the American Con-
vention went into effect in 1978, it has not had the practical effect
of the European Convention, which has been in effect since 1953.
Nevertheless, the American Convention is important because it
ratifies the underlying premise of the European Convention that
nations are obligated to respect and protect certain human rights.
The above-mentioned declarations have the assent and support
of a large and representative part of the international commu-
nity.84 Although the declarations place different emphases on dif-
ferent rights, all declare that torture and slavery always are imper-
missible. 85 Reaffirmation of the principles contained in the
agreements confirms the force of these principles as international
law.8" The declarations state that violations of human rights do
more than offend human sensibilities of right and wrong; violations
of human rights adversely affect the interests of foreign nations in
world peace.8 7 International mechanisms protect human rights,
thus emphasizing that human rights are of international concern
and that the community of nations expects individual nations to
82. Id. art. 27.
83. Id. art. 79.
84. Because the declarations were accepted by numerous nations, the declarations became
a source of international law. See note 38 supra.
85. European Convention, supra note 3, arts. 3-4, 15; American Convention on Human
Rights, supra note 79, arts. 5-6, 27; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
supra note 3, arts. 4, 7-8; Umversal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 3, arts. 4-5.
86. See The Human Rights Phenomenon, supra note 39, at 678.
87. "[T]he aim of the Council of Europe is the achievement of greater unity between its
Members [O]ne of the methods by which that aim is to be pursued is the maintenance
and further realisation [sic] of Human Rights "European Convention, supra note 3,
Preamble.
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respect human rights.8
Arguably, due to the lack of real sanctions provided by the inter-
national declarations and the lack of sanctions exercised by nations
in practice, the international declarations may represent denuncia-
tions of torture and other human rights violations that are not
binding on nations as international obligations because the decla-
rations leave the enforcement of human rights to domestic law.89
Most of the declarations are nonbinding treaties or have no practi-
cal means of enforcement.90 The binding force of international law,
however, does not depend on the existence of sanctions to enforce
that law.9 1 Even where military or economic sanctions are absent,
moral disapproval evidenced by diplomatic sanctions may support
the binding character of an international rule.92
Lack of sanctions, however, may evidence lack of intent on the
part of nations to be bound by the custom or declaration. As stated
above, a rule acquires force as international law because nations
consider themselves bound to obey that rule. One commentator
has noted that this intent to be bound is difficult to establish be-
cause "nations often speak with many voices when explaining an
action. '9 4 Because no real sanctions exist, more nations are willing
to sign the declarations, thus rendering the apparent international
consensus illusory.95 In additon, states may sign the declarations
out of political expediency. Signatory nations' freedom of action is
not limited practically by the agreement, and they gain the benefit
of national and international public opinion by taking a stand
88. "The principle of domestic definition must be rejected as inconsistent with the
basic idea, underlying the existence of international instruments, of establishing interna-
tional criteria for the definition of human rights." Klayman, supra note 43, at 456 (footnote
omitted).
89. See, e.g., note 60 supra.
90. See Lane, supra note 2, at 282-83. For example, under the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, the Conciliation Commission may not consider a violation of the
Covenant without the "prior consent of the States Parties concerned." International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 3, art. 42. Even if the Conciliation Commis-
sion considers the matter, the Commission's findings are not binding on the nations. Id.
91. 1 C. HYDE, supra note 1, § 4; 1 M. WHrrEMAN, supra note 24, at 58-66.
92. 1 M. WHrrEMAN, supra note 24, at 59.
93. See notes 22-24 & accompanying text supra.
94. Schmertz, The Establishment of Foreign and International Law in American Courts:
A Procedural Overview, 18 VA. J. IN'L L. 697, 721 (1978).
95. See Lane, supra note 2, at 283 & n.81.
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addition, exhaustion of remedies will not be required of a victim of
human rights violations if the remedies provided by the victim's
government are not "sufficient or effective,"'105 if the victim has
been prevented from exercising or exhausting the available reme-
dies,106 or if there is "unwarranted delay in rendering a final judg-
ment. ' 10 7 In each of these situations, the victim is denied relief in
practical effect. l08 Thus, government refusal to prevent torture or
to provide remedies for torture that has occurred constitutes the
international violation.
The court in Filartiga held that "deliberate torture perpetrated
under color of official authority violates, international law."'' 09
Although color of official authority may be all that is required to
make a government liable for certain violations of the laws of war
committed by its soldiers,110 color of authority is not enough to
make an act of torture a violation of international law."' The court
in Filartiga, by referring to threats made against Dr. Filartiga's at-
torney, implied that Dr. Filartiga was prevented from exhausting
his remedies in Paraguay." 2 The court in Filartiga also mentioned
that the man who confessed to the murder of Dr. Filartiga's son
had never been convicted or sentenced."18 These facts indicate that
higher authority, in face of numerous allegations, manifests mdifference by re-
fusing any adequate investigation of their truth or falsity, or that in judicial
proceedings, a fair hearing of such complaints is denied.
Id. at 195-96.
105. In The Greek Case, the European Commission determined that "the three applicant
governments had not at that stage offered substantial evidence of an administrative practice
in Greece of torture ., that nevertheless the remedies indicated by the respondent
Government could not be considered as sufficient or effective." Id. at 187.
106. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 79, art. 46.
107. Id.
108. Where torture has become official policy or exists by official sufferance, na-
tional remedies are likely to be insufficient or nonexistent. In this context, the
usual rule of exhaustion of local remedies is a cruel hoax upon the torture vic-
tim. In order to prevent this charade of the torturing government insisting that
the victim run a gauntlet of meaningless remedies, the [European] Commission
developed the notion of an administrative practice of torture.
Klayman, supra note 43, at 509 (footnotes omitted).
109. 630 F.2d at 876.
110. See 3 C. HYDE, supra note 1, § 713.
111. See notes 98-108 & accompanying text supra.
112. 630 F.2d at 878.
113. Id.
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the Paraguayan government failed to provide criminal and civil
remedies for the torture, and thus exhaustion of domestic remedies
was not necessary for a finding that the torture was a violation by
Paraguay of the international law of human rights. 1 The court in
Filartiga, however, did not explicitly make denial of remedies the
basis of its holding that international law had been violated. To
this extent, the court's holding is mconsistent with international
law.
A separate issue is whether the individual torturer may be liable
under international law for an act of torture. Unlike war crimes'15
and the acts of genocide for which individuals are held internation-
ally liable,11 only governments must answer internationally for vi-
olations of human rights such as the peacetime torture of persons
within their jurisdictions. 117 Individuals are liable only under do-
mestic law for human rights violations such as torture.11 The en-
forcement mechanisms of the European Convention provide for
complaints only against governments.119 Thus, in The Greek Case,
the European Commission for Human Rights made recommenda-
tions to Greece to remedy violations of human rights; no individual
was brought before the commission as a defendant because the in-
ternational law of human rights deals only with the actions of
governments. 120
In Filartiga the court held that because torture violates interna-
tional law, a torturer is subject to the jurisdiction of a United
114. See notes 98-108 & accompanying text supra.
115. See 11 M. WHITEmAN, supra note 24, at 1019.
116. "Persons charged with genocide shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the
State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribu-
nal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties winch shall have
accepted its jurisdiction." Convention on the Prevention and Pumshment of the Crime of
Genocide, G.A. Res. 260A (1948), reprinted tn BAsic DocuMENTS, supra note 3, at 70.
117. The international enforcement bodies concern themselves only with convention vio-
lations committed by nations. For example, the European Convention states that "[a]ny
High Contracting Party may refer to the Commission any alleged breach of the provi-
sions of the Convention by another High Contracting Party." European Convention, supra
note 3, art. 24.
118. The European Convention, for example, provides that "[e]veryone whose rights and
freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a
national authority." Id. art. 13.
119. See, e.g., id. arts. 31-32.
120. See notes 103-05 & accompanying text supra.
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States district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1350.121 To the extent that
this holding is based on the torturer's violating international law,
the holding misconstrued established principles of international
law. The torturer's nation violates international law by failing to
provide civil and criminal remedies for the act of torture, but the
individual torturer violates only domestic law. Therefore, the court
should not have extended its jurisdiction over an individual
torturer.
CONSTRUCTION AND APPLICATION OF THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE
The language of the Alien Tort Statute, codified at 28 U.S.C. §
1350, is cast in broad, undefined terms: "The district courts shall
have jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States. ' 122 Assuming a violation of the "law of nations" or a
"treaty of the United States" may be identified, the size of the
class of cases cognizable under section 1350 remains uncertain. Ar-
guably, the language of section 1350 permits a district court to
have subject matter jurisdiction of any alien's claim against any
other alien, regardless of the situs of the alleged wrong, because
section 1350 does not require a tort claim to have any relationship
with the United States. Although the statutory language does not
require expressly a nexus between the alien's claim and the United
States, limiting district courts' jurisdiction under section 1350 to
actions with some nexus to the United States is reasonable and
consistent with the purposes of the statute.
Legislative intent is usually the most important basis for statu-
tory construction. 123 Unfortunately, the legislative history of the
Judiciary Act of 1789, of which the Alien Tort Statute was a part,
is not conclusive. 124 Nonetheless, history indicates that the Judici-
ary Act of 1789 was a conservative compromise won by those mem-
bers of Congress who desired to limit the power of the federal judi-
121. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1976); 630 F.2d at 876.
122. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1976).
123. See, e.g., Graver v. Commissioner, 142 F.2d 363, 366 (4th Cir. 1944).
124. Congressional debates over the Judiciary Act of 1789 that appear in the annals of
Congress are not helpful. Mention of § 9(b) of the Judiciary Act, which gives jurisdiction to
federal courts over alien complaints of tortious violations of international law, does not ap-
pear. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 782-85, 796-809 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1789).
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ciary 125 Accordingly, this narrow interpretation of section 1350
lends support to the view that section 1350 provides jurisdiction
only if a nexus exists between the United States and the claim
asserted.
Historically, section 1350 has been viewed as part of a scheme to
enable the federal government to meet its international obliga-
tions.126 Accordingly, if the United States has committed a viola-
tion of international law against an alien, or if an alien is injured
by an internationally wrongful act and the United States has a
duty of jurisdiction under international law, 127 section 1350 gives
an alien access to United States federal courts, enabling the United
States government to meet its international obligations to the alien
and the alien's government. 128 Thus, the perceived purpose of sec-
tion 1350 is consistent with the requirement that a nexus exist be-
tween the United States and the claim asserted. So long as the
United States has an international obligation to fulfill, a nexus will
125. See Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37
HARV. L. Rlv. 49, 49-55 (1923).
Evidently, at some stage in the drafting of the Bill, a contest had been waged
between those men who wished to confine the Federal judicial power within
narrow limits and to leave to the State Courts the chief part of the original
jurisdiction, and those men who wished to vest in the Federal Courts the full
judicial power which the Constitution granted - namely that it should "ex-
tend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of
the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their au-
thority." The former faction prevailed.
Id. at 62.
126. One of the principal concerns in establishing the union was giving the national gov-
ernment the capability to deal effectively with foreign nations. Dickenson, The Law of Na-
tions as Part of the National Law of the United States, 101 U. PA. L. Rlv. 26, 41-46 (1952).
Accordingly, Alexander Hamilton wrote: "The Union will undoubtedly be answerable to for-
eign powers for the conduct of its members. And the responsibility for an injury ought ever
to be accompanied with the faculty of preventing it." THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (A. Hamilton)
at 517 (Modern Library College ed. 1937).
127. In United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479 (1887), the Court stated, "The law of na-
tions requires every national government to use 'due diligence' to prevent a wrong being
done within its own dominion to another nation with which it is at peace or to the people
thereof." Id. at 484. Hyde states, "The commission of particular acts may be so detri-
mental to the welfare of the international society that its international law may impose
upon [the State] the obligation [to punish the offender]." 1 C. HYDE, supra note 1, § llA.
128. Hyde suggests that one example of jurisdiction required by international law is at-
tack upon an ambassador. If an ambassador is attacked by another alien within the United
States, § 1350 would provide federal jurisdiction because the United States has a duty under
international law to penalize these attacks. See 1 C. HYDE, supra note 1, § 11A.
ALIEN TORT STATUTE JURISDICTION
exist between the United States and alien's claim.
Previous interpretations of a statute carry great weight in deter-
mining the correct interpretation of the statute.129 Although no
court has decided directly the question of whether there must be a
nexus between the claim and the United States to sustain jurisdic-
tion under section 1350,130 in Abdul-Rahman Omar Adra v. Clift"'3
the United States District Court for the District of Maryland sus-
tained jurisdiction of an alien's claim in circumstances in which
the nexus was present. In Clift, the defendant, an Iraqi citizen,
brought her child into the United States using an illegal pass-
port. i32 The plaintiff, a citizen of Lebanon and the defendant's
husband, sued to recover custody of the child, arguing that the de-
fendant unlawfully had taken and withheld the child.133 The court
in Clift sustained jurisdiction under section 1350; because a pass-
port was a "political document," use of an illegal passport was a
violation of the law of nations.3 Significantly, because the viola-
tion occurred within United States territory, the United States had
some responsibility of jurisdiction over the offense. Thus, Clift
conforms to the rule that section 1350 should be used to enable the
United States to meet international obligations, and supports the
view that, for the court to sustain jurisdiction under section 1350,
the United States must have some nexus with the action.
The court of appeals in Filartiga, however, did not inquire into
the nature of jurisdiction extended by section 1350. In discussing
the statute, the court stated that the body of international law ex-
pands over tine and that therefore the class of international rights
amenable to section 1350 jurisdiction expands over time.'35 This
analysis is deceptive because the class of defendants and require-
ments for connection with the forum established by the statute
129. See Francis v. Southern Pac. Co., 333 U.S. 445, 449-50 (1948).
130. Jurisdiction has been sustained under § 1350 in only two cases. See note 8 & accom-
panying text supra. Other courts declined to sustain jurisdiction under § 1350 because no
volation of international law had been shown. See, e.g., Lopes v. Reederei Richard Schroder,
225 F. Supp. 292, 297 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
131. 195 F Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961).
132. Id. at 859, 864-65.
133. Id. at 859.
134. Id. at 864-65. The Court in Clift also recognized that the use of the illegal passport
by the defendant constituted a violation of the law of the United States. Id. at 864.
135. 630 F.2d at 887.
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should not expand over time. In addition, the court in Filartiga
granted jurisdiction for an alien plaintiff suing an alien defendant
for an action occurring in the alien's country Because individual
torturers do not incur international liability, the United States was
under no international duty to assert jurisdiction, absent a nexus
between the claim asserted and the United States. The United
States is not bound internationally to provide remedies for acts of
torture occurring in foreign nations. Thus, because the tort com-
plained of did not have any nexus with the United States, section
1350 does not provide jurisdiction."3 6 In this regard, the court's de-
cision in Filartiga was erroneous.
CONCLUSION
The court in Filartiga was correct in holding torture to be a vio-
lation of international law. The court, however, misapplied the
principles of international agreements in holding individual tortur-
ers liable. In any event, the court's decision in Filartiga will pro-
vide major support for the contention that nations are obligated
under international law to protect those within their borders from
torture.
Although the legislative intent behind section 1350 is unclear,
the court's application of section 1350 was inconsistent with a logi-
cal construction of the statute. Because individual torturers are not
liable to torture victins, and because acts of torture lacking some
nexus with the United States should not provide jurisdiction under
section 1350, Filartiga should not have any significant effect on
subsequent litigation in the United States. If, however, the court's
interpretation in Filartiga stands, then the United States federal
courts could become an international forum for complaints about
torture and other human rights violations. Such potentially unlim-
ited jurisdiction is not justified under present federal jurisdictional
principles or international law, and Filartiga should not be as-
serted as a basis for unlimited jurisdiction in federal courts.
T.M.
136. But see Blum & Stemhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over International Human Rights
Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act after Filartiga v. Pefa-Irala, 22 H~Av. I1rr'L L.J. 53
(1981); Case Comment, 15 GA. L. REv. 504 (1981).
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